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Harvard⎯most notably B. F. Skinner and E. G. Boring⎯were also actively applying 
Bridgman’s conceptual strictures to the study of mind and behavior. In this paper, I shed new 
light on the history of operationism by reconstructing the Harvard debates about operational 
definition in the years before Stevens published his seminal articles. Building on a large set of 
archival evidence from the Harvard University Archives, I argue that we can get a more 
complete understanding of Stevens’ contributions if we better grasp the operationisms of his 
former teachers and direct colleagues at Harvard’s Department of Philosophy and Psychology. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 1935, Stanley Smith Stevens published two articles in which he urged for a “revolution that 
will put an end to the possibility of revolutions” in psychology. Building on P. W. Bridgman’s 
methodological prescriptions for physicists, Stevens argued that all psychological concepts 
need to be strictly defined in terms of public and repeatable operations (1935a, 323). If the 
study of mind and behavior is to be taken seriously as a rigorous science, Stevens argued, 
psychologists have to make sure that they are not talking at cross purposes when they are 
discussing their theories about ‘experience’, ‘consciousness’, and ‘sensation’⎯they have to 
make sure that their concepts are ‘operationally defined’.  
Stevens’ call for conceptual rigor was spectacularly successful. Within a few years after 
the appearance of his papers, Sigmund Koch remembers, “virtually everyone in psychology 
[…] was some kind of operationist. It was as if the adjective ‘operational’ had become 
cemented to the noun ‘definition’” (1992, 269). Even today, most textbooks in psychology 
teach students that definitions ought to be operational, arguing that “providing an operational 
definition of variables” is “a hallmark of well-conducted research” (Carlson et al. 2010, 55). 
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Although few contemporary psychologists accept the most radical implications of 
operationism⎯e.g. the view “that the meaning of a psychological concept is nothing more […] 
than the set of operations by which the conceptual entity is observed” (Stevens 1946, my 
emphasis)⎯the view that our variables require operational definitions is as common today as 
it was eighty years ago.  
In view of Stevens’ success in spreading the operationist message, it is small wonder 
that his papers are still widely cited in contemporary discussions about operational definition. 
Still, he was far from the only psychologist to call for conceptual hygiene. Some of Stevens’ 
direct colleagues at Harvard⎯most notably B. F. Skinner and E. G. Boring⎯were also actively 
applying Bridgman’s conceptual strictures to the study of mind and behavior. Skinner used 
Bridgman’s perspective to rework the foundations of behaviorism, whereas Boring and his 
student Douglas McGregor wrote a paper in which they developed an operationist perspective 
to redefine psychophysics as a natural science (McGregor 1935). Outside Harvard, too, 
scholars were actively developing operationist views about the nature of psychological 
concepts (e.g. Tolman 1936; Hull 1943). In addition, like-minded movements also started to 
gain traction in the philosophy of science (e.g. Campbell 1928; Blumberg and Feigl 1931).1  
Existing work on the development of psychological operationism mostly focuses on the 
contributions of Stevens (Hardcastle 1995; Feest 2005) and, outside Harvard, C. L. Hull’s and 
E. C. Tolman’s publications from the late 1930s and early 1940s (Green 1992; Feest 2005). In 
this paper, I aim to shed new light on the history of operationism by reconstructing the Harvard 
 
1 In general, operationism seems to have been ‘in the air’ at the time. See Rogers (1989) for a 
reconstruction of the historical and contextual factors that contributed to the success of 
operationism in the 1930s and 1940s.  For on overview of the intellectual climate at Harvard, 
see Isaac (2011).   
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debate about operational definition in the years before Stevens published his seminal articles. 
I argue that we can get a more complete understanding of Stevens’ contributions if we better 
grasp the operationisms of his former teachers and direct colleagues at Harvard’s Department 
of Philosophy and Psychology. Building on a large set of archival evidence from the Harvard 
University Archives, I argue that Stevens’ colleagues mostly used operationism as an 
instrument to justify their existing perspectives on psychology and to attack approaches and 
theories from opposing schools.2  
Thus far, the contributions of Stevens’ direct colleagues have been somewhat 
understudied  by historians of psychology. Skinner’s views on operational definition have been 
thoroughly studied (e.g. Day 1969; Allen 1980; Flanagan 1980; Moore 1985) but these 
discussions focus almost exclusively on his rejection of certain variants of operationism after 
the mid-1940s. Some scholars briefly discuss Boring’s influence on Stevens in the year leading 
up to the publication of the latter’s papers (e.g. Hardcastle 1995, 420-422; Feest 2005, 138-
140), but little attention has been paid to the former’s independent contributions to the 
development of psychological operationism. Walter (1990) and Grace (2001) do mention 
Boring’s and McGregor’s paper in their discussions of the reception of Stevens’ operationism 
but they fail to notice that this paper antedates Stevens’ articles. If we are to better understand 
 
2 The archival evidence on which this paper is built consists primarily of material from the E. 
G. Boring Papers (collection HUG 4229.5), the P. W. Bridgman Papers (collection HUG 
4234.xx), the B. F. Skinner Papers (collection HUGFP 60.xx as well as accession 14328), and 
the S. S. Stevens Papers (collection HUGFP 2.xx). Documents from these collections will be 
referred to by collection code, date of creation (if known), and box, folder, and/or item number. 
In transcribing autograph notes, drafts, and letters, I have aimed to minimize editorial 
interference and chosen not to correct ungrammatical shorthand.  
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Stevens’ seminal publications, we need a more complete account of the contributions of his 
colleagues Skinner, Boring, and McGregor.  
This paper is structured as follows. After summarizing the main features of Bridgman’s 
operational approach (section 2), I reconstruct the way in which Skinner used Bridgman’s plea 
to rework the foundations of his ‘science of behavior’ (section 3). Next, I discuss the complex 
relation between Skinner and Boring, showing how the two clashed about the merits of the 
behaviorist approach (sections 4). I analyze Boring’s operationist turn between 1930 and 1934 
(sections 5-6) and reconstruct the ways in which he and his student McGregor used 
operationism in order to justify the scientific status of psychophysics (sections 6-7). Finally, I 
turn to Stevens’ development and take stock by comparing his views with those of his 
colleagues (sections 8-9). 
 
 
2. Bridgman’s plea for conceptual hygiene 
 
Percy Williams Bridgman was a Harvard physicist who worked on the physics of high 
pressures and was the first person to create a device that could create pressures of more than 
40.000 MPa. Next to his experimental work, which would be awarded with the Nobel Prize in 
1946, the Harvard professor was particularly interested in the philosophical foundations of 
physics, as he had been intrigued by the methodological and epistemological implications of 
the recent revolutions in relativity and quantum theory. In his book The Logic of Modern 
Physics, Bridgman attempted to create a way out of the conceptual confusion caused by the 
advances in modern physics, trying to formulate “something approaching […] to a systematic 
philosophy of all physics which shall cover the experimental domains already consolidated as 
well as those which are now making us so much trouble” (1927, ix-x). 
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When Bridgman published his Logic in 1927, he had no idea that his book was to have 
a tremendous impact on the course of experimental psychology. Nor did he foresee that his 
views would be turned into a proper ‘ism’⎯that scholars would use his book to proclaim that 
the “[o]perational doctrine makes explicit recognition of the fact that a concept […] has 
empirical meaning only if it stands for definite, concrete operations” (Stevens 1935b, 517, my 
emphasis). For, Bridgman believed, he was not a defending a strict methodological doctrine; 
he was merely defending an operational “attitude” or “approach”. Although he opens his book 
with a claim about meaning that seems to entail a strict criterion of empirical significance (“In 
general, we mean by any concepts nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is 
synonymous with the corresponding set of operations”, p. 5), he also warns the reader that “[i]t 
will never be possible to give a clean-cut logical analysis of the conceptual situation”. Our 
concepts, Bridgman maintained, are simply too “hazy” (1927, 25). A year later, Bridgman 
repeated this warning in a review of Norman Campbell’s An Account of the Principles of 
Measurement and Calculation (1928)⎯a book that seems to defend an equally rigorous view 
about meaning.  In his review, Bridgman mentioned that he is “not in sympathy with the […] 
view […] that there are in nature things which may be defined with the complete logical 
precision which we have come to associate with the entities of the mathematician” (Bridgman 
1928, 999).  
Rather than offering a strict criterion of empirical significance, Bridgman’s book was 
mostly a plea for conceptual hygiene: if Einstein’s revolution in physics has taught us anything, 
Bridgman argued, it is that the concepts of physics are inadequate.3 Einstein’s revolt would not 
have been necessary if we had been more careful in our use of the concepts ‘time’ and 
‘simultaneity’⎯if we had adopted a more “critical attitude toward our whole conceptual 
 
3 The remainder of this section is based on Verhaegh (2020). 
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structure” (1927, 1). For, Bridgman argued, we did not need any experimental discovery to 
find out what Einstein discovered; an operational analysis of the concept of ‘simultaneity’ 
would have sufficed to at least leave open the possibility that simultaneity is not absolute, a 
conclusion which would have prevented Newton from building his physics on an unwarranted 
assumption. As a result, if we want to circumvent crises in the foundations of physics in the 
future, we have to be more careful⎯we have to submit the concepts of physics to an operational 
analysis. 
In order to explain what he means when he urges for an ‘operational analysis’, 
Bridgman extensively discusses the concept of ‘length’ in the first chapter of The Logic of 
Modern Physics. 4  If we thoroughly analyze the operations we use in measuring length, 
Bridgman argues, we have to conclude that even our use of this very basic concept rests on 
unwarranted assumptions: we use different operations to measure length in different 
circumstances without asking ourselves whether we can actually maintain that all these 
operations are measuring the same ‘property’. In ordinary situations we use rods and rulers to 
measure length, whereas in astronomy distance is measured by trigonometric triangulation, 
which is an entirely different operation:  
 
 
4 Bridgman believed that we cannot define what an operational analysis is but that we can only 
see what the operational point of view entails by applying it to specific concepts. See, for 
example, Bridgman’s letter to Hornell Hart: “I have never given a formal definition of what 
the operation is. This has been deliberate on my part. I have always insisted […] that the best 
way of learning what the operational approach is, is to see it in action as applied to concrete 
examples” (May 27, 1953, HUG 4234.10, Box 3, Folder 8). 
 
8 
We thus see that in the extension from terrestrial to great stellar distances the concept 
of length has changed completely in character. To say that a certain star is 105 light 
years distant is actually and conceptually an entire[ly] different kind of thing from 
saying that a certain goal post is 100 meters distant. (1927, 17–18)  
 
If we cannot show that these different procedures yield similar results in similar circumstances, 
Bridgman concludes, we have to accept that we are dealing with different notions. We cannot 
just assume that ‘ruler length’ and ‘triangular length’ are the same concepts.  
 
 
3. Skinner’s plan  
 
Bridgman’s book quickly received a considerable amount of attention. The Logic of Modern 
Physics was selected as one of the ‘Forty Notable American Books of 1927’ by the American 
Library Association (MacMillan to Bridgman, August 4, 1928, HUG 4234.12, Folder 1) and it 
was favorably reviewed in a host of journals, including general periodicals like The Nation, 
The Observer, and The Saturday Review (Verhaegh 2020). In the academic world, especially 
psychologists were fairly quick to see the potential of Bridgman’s approach, perhaps because 
they were inspired by his remark that “[i]t would doubtless conduce greatly to clarity of thought 
if the operational mode of thinking were adopted in all fields of inquiry” (1927, 30, my 
emphasis). Indeed, in one of the first discussions of Bridgman’s book in the psychological 
literature, H. M. Johnson argues that a “rigorous application of [Bridgman’s] method to the 
analysis of psychological ‘problems’ would show a huge proportion to be spurious, and would 
forestall much unnecessary and irrelevant experimentation” (1930, 113n). Johnson, a 
psychologist from Pittsburgh, illustrated his argument by applying Bridgman’s approach to one 
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of the most fundamental concepts in psychophysics. Using the tools that Bridgman had offered 
in his Logic, Johnson objected to the widespread assumption that Fechner’s law should be 
interpreted as expressing the relation between physical stimuli and the intensity of our 
sensations. If we express Fechner’s law as  
 
𝛾 = 𝑘 ∗ log(𝛽 𝑏⁄ )      (1) 
 
in which 𝛽 is the size of the stimulus, 𝑏 is the threshold value, and 𝑘 is a logarithmic constant, 
Johnson argued, we should not interpret 𝛾 as expressing ‘intensity of sensation’. Rather we 
should equate 𝛾 with the physical operations which we use to determine 𝑘, 𝑏, and 𝛽. If we 
want to argue that 𝛾 is something more and can be equated to the intensity of introspectional 
sensation (I), we need to specify an independent operation which we can use to determine I 
and examine whether I is equivalent to 𝛾: 
 
[The meaning of 𝛾] is the operations that create it. It is often discussed, however, as if 
it were interchangeable with another concept, which we may call the intensity of 
introspectional sensation, and denote by the symbol I. The question is, whether I = 𝛾. 
To give an answer that satisfies the operational criterion we must first specify the 
operations by which I is determined […] if no feasible operations can be specified […] 
the question whether I is equivalent to 𝛾 becomes a question whether an undefined 
concept is equivalent to a defined concept; […] Busy people usually do not entertain 
such a question very long after they have detected its character. (Johnson 1930, 116) 
 
Bridgman’s criterion, in other words, allowed Johnson to do what behaviorists had been doing 
for almost twenty years, to criticize the appeal to introspection on methodological grounds. 
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This time around, however, Johnson could appeal to methodological prescriptions developed 
by a world-renowned physicist and formulate the even stronger objection that the notion of 
introspectional sensation is meaningless if it cannot be operationally defined. 
Some behaviorists soon started to see the appeal of the operational approach as well. 
Among them was B. F. Skinner, at the time still a Harvard graduate student. Skinner, who had 
been “converted to the behavioristic position” after reading Watson’s Behaviorism (Skinner 
1979, 11), started his graduate program in 1928, three years before Stevens. It did not take 
long, however, before Skinner discovered that his teachers at Harvard were not particularly 
interested in behavioristic approaches to psychology and he quickly turned to W. J. Crozier 
and Hudson Hoagland at the Department of Biology, since they were discussing Pavlov and 
conditioned reflexes in their physiology courses (1979, 13-5, 21). Influenced by the two, 
Skinner started to specialize in what he himself called “the behavior of intact organisms” 
(Skinner 1931, 427), a field of study which aims to analyze behavior without delving into the 
underlying physiological mechanisms.5 Despite his very limited background in the study of 
behavior, Skinner soon published an experimental study on what he called “eating reflexes” in 
rats. In short, Skinner showed that the rate at which deprived rats eat their daily rations of food 
over the course of two hours is lawful and can be mathematically described by the power 
function 
 
N = Ktn,              (2) 
 
where N = the amount of food eaten at time t and K and n are constants.  Even more surprisingly, 
Skinner showed that n is an approximately constant magnitude (between 0,67 and 0,71), even 
 
5 The remainder of this section is largely built on Verhaegh (2019). 
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when the conditions of the experiments (food size, rat, and exposure to food on the day before 
the experiment) varied (Skinner 1930, 437). In a letter to his parents, Skinner cheerfully 
reported: 
 
I got […] some remarkable results from the data of my experiment. […] In a word, I 
have demonstrated that the rate in which a rat eats food, over a period of two hours, is a 
square function of the time. In other words, what heretofore was supposed to be ‘free’ 
behavior on the part of the rat is now shown to be just as much subject to natural laws 
as, for example, the rate of his pulse. (Skinner 1979, 59). 
 
It was about the same time that Skinner learned about The Logic of Modern Physics from 
Cuthbert Daniel, a former MIT student in chemical engineering who had come to Harvard to 
work with Bridgman (ibid., 41). 
Bridgman’s approach chimed in with Skinner’s perspective on the philosophy of 
science, which was also shaped by two books he read for L. J. Henderson’s and George Sarton’s 
courses on the history of science: Ernst Mach’s The Science of Mechanics and Henri Poincaré’s 
Science et Méthode.6 Inspired by these positivist readings, Skinner decided to study the history 
of the concept of ‘reflex’, which had been fundamental in his experimental study on eating 
reflexes. Starting with Descartes’ account in Traité de l’homme, Skinner reconstructed the 
history of the notion in both psychology and physiology and published it as “The Concept of 
the Reflex in the Description of Behavior” (1931b). In this paper, Skinner concluded that “[a] 
 
6  See Smith (1986, ch. 9) for a reconstruction of Mach’s influence on Skinner’s early 
theoretical development,  
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reflex […] has no scientific meaning apart from its definition in terms of […] experimental 
operations” (1931a, 450), an insight he directly attributed to Mach, Poincaré, and Bridgman:   
 
The reader will recognize a method of criticism first formulated with respect to 
scientific concepts by Ernst Mach and perhaps better stated by Henri Poincaré. To the 
works of these men and to Bridgman’s excellent application of the method to more 
modern concepts the reader is referred for any discussion of the method qua method. 
(1931a, 427) 
 
In the remainder of his paper, which also served as the first part of his dissertation (Skinner 
1931b), the young graduate student proposed a definition of ‘reflex’ in terms of publicly 
observable operations. In short, Skinner uncovered a definition that satisfied what he perceived 
to be Bridgman’s operationist’s strictures. Where psychologists and physiologists had often 
appealed to the ‘involuntary’ or ‘unconscious’ character of reflexes in their 
definitions⎯concepts that, Skinner believed, are problematic from an operationist point of 
view⎯Skinner argued that a reflex is nothing more than “an observed correlation of two 
events, a stimulus and a response” (1931a, 445). For correlations between stimuli and 
responses are directly observable.  
Skinner’s paper on the notion of ‘reflex’ set into motion a new program of defining the 
core concepts of psychology in operationist terms; within a year after his reflex paper, Skinner 
also published two articles on the concept of ‘drive’ (1932a; 1932b). Indeed, in a note titled 
“Plan of the campaign for the years 30-60”, Skinner listed “operational definitions of all 
psychological concepts” as one of his two main career goals for the next decades: 
 
 Plan of the campaign for the years 30-60 
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1. Experimental description of behavior. Continue along present lines. Properties of 
conditioning, extinction, drives, emotions, etc. No surrender to the physiology of 
the central nervous system. […] 
2. Behaviorism vs. Psychology. Support behavioristic methodology throughout. 
Operational definitions of all psychological concepts. 7  (November 17, 1932, 
HUGFP 60.50, Box 3, Folder 6) 
 
Skinner, in other words, aimed to use Bridgman’s operational approach to improve the 
foundations of behaviorism. Yet, Skinner did not only use operationism for constructive 
purposes. In his unpublished 1930s notebook Sketch for an Epistemology, which contains his 
notes for a monograph he started writing in the early 1930s, Skinner also used his newfound 
methodological principles to criticize alternative theories about mind and knowledge, including 
some of the very doctrines that had once been defended by Mach. One of Skinner’s reasons for 
writing the book on epistemology, these notes show, was his dissatisfaction with the widespread 
influence of phenomenalism⎯the radically empiricist view that physical objects are nothing 
but constructions out of primary sense experiences (‘phenomena’). In the early 1930s, 
phenomenalism was a popular view about the nature of our knowledge about the physical world, 
defended by epistemologists, psychologists, and by influential physicists like Arthur Eddington 
and James Jeans. When Skinner started working on his Sketch, both Eddington (The Nature of 
the Physical World) and Jeans (The Mysterious Universe) had just published books that relied 
on strongly phenomenalist conceptions of science. Skinner, on the other hand, strongly objected 
to the growing popularity of phenomenalism. In one his notes in Sketch for an Epistemology, 
he described the situation as follows:  
 
7 See also Skinner (1979, 115).  
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Recent trends are toward a solution of the dilemmas of physics in terms of a theory of 
knowledge. It would be a pity if physicists in turning to epistemology should take up an 
out-moded scheme of mind, which presents as many difficulties in its own 
systematization as the physicist is trying to rid himself of in physics. Jeans and 
Eddington are already out of the frying pan into the fire. This movement cannot be traced 
to one source. On the one hand lies positivism, on the other Ernst Mach. (HUGFP 60.50, 
box 3, folder 5, my transcription) 
 
Skinner’s reference to Mach seems surprising considering the fact that his work on the notion 
of ‘reflex’ was modeled on the latter’s The Science of Mechanics. Still, Skinner’s early notes 
show that he strongly disagreed with Mach’s The Analysis of Sensations, a book he read as a 
staunch defense of phenomenalism. According to Skinner, Mach had it exactly backwards: we 
do not need a phenomenalistic analysis of science, we need a scientific analysis of ‘phenomena’: 
 
Mach reduces the concepts of science to a subjective basis […] we can return to an 
objective expression by asking him for a definition of sensation. This can only be 
supplied […] in terms of Mach’s behavior (as a scientist). Thus while Mach makes 
science personal (and therefore private), the definition of sensation makes it again 
public, i.e. a matter of human behavior. (HUGFP 60.50, box 3, folder 5, my 
transcription) 
 
Whereas epistemologists and mentalistic psychologists aimed to secure our scientific 
knowledge by reconstructing our fallible concepts and theories out of ‘indubitable’ sense 
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experiences, Skinner aimed to revert the picture: we should not aim to ground science in 
sensation, we should ground sensation in behavioral science.   
It is no coincidence that Skinner demands a public definition of sensation in arguing 
against phenomenalism. Sketch for an Epistemology is written from what Skinner considered 
to be an operationist perspective. Skinner notes that we ought to try “the operational method 
on ‘knowledge’”, that knowledge should be “operationally defined”, and that historical 
advances in the sciences might be explained by the fact that scientists (unconsciously) relied 
on “a positivistic (Machian, Poincarean, Bridgmanian) philosophy of science” (HUGFP 60.50, 
Box 3, Folder 5). Skinner, in other words, argued against the phenomenalists’ attempts to 
reduce science to sense experience by applying Bridgman’s call for conceptual hygiene to 
notions like ‘knowledge’, ‘mind’, and ‘sensation’; the phenomenalists’ proposals are simply 
meaningless if they do not provide an operational definition of ‘sense experience’. Skinner, of 
course, believed that the only viable definition of sense experience would be a behavioristic 
one. 
 
 
4. Skinner vs. Boring 
 
Skinner’s dissertation on the notion of reflex was supervised by E. G. Boring, the director of 
Harvard’s psychological laboratory. Unlike Skinner, Boring was far from a behaviorist at the 
time as he had criticized the movement in the first (1929) edition of his seminal A History of 
Experimental Psychology. According to Boring, behaviorists face a dilemma: either they 
incorporate the problems of traditional psychology (e.g. questions about consciousness, 
introspection, and sensation) and translate its concepts into behaviorist terms⎯in which case 
their hypotheses become as imprecise as the theories they are supposed to replace⎯or they 
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decide to ignore these traditional objects of study and their theories become strictly 
physiological: 
 
Behaviorism […] is very closely allied to physiology. Probably the only way it is to be 
distinguished from physiology is by its problems, which came, not from within itself, 
but from the conventional psychology […] As behaviorism began to absorb most of the 
content of the older psychology […] much of the original precision of physiological 
method was lost.8 (1929, 585-6) 
 
Behaviorism, in other words, either reduces to physiology (in which case it does not compete 
with conventional psychology) or it incorporates the questions of traditional psychology, 
thereby importing the very problems it was supposed to dissolve. 
Skinner was annoyed by passages like these as he was convinced that there is a middle 
way between physiology and conventional psychology. Indeed, Skinner’s operational 
definition of the concept of reflex implicitly aimed to show that we can avoid both horns of 
Boring’s dilemma: if we operationally define a reflex as a correlation between stimulus and 
response, Skinner argued, we do not have to worry about intervening physiological variables 
(i.e. events between stimulus and response) nor do we have to incorporate the imprecise 
concepts that were associated with reflexes in traditional psychology (e.g. ‘involuntary 
behavior’ or ‘unconscious behavior’). 
Skinner’s first major experimental study on eating reflexes in rats (section 3) also 
illustrates his idea that there is a middle way between physiology and traditional psychology. 
 
8 As an example, Boring discusses Watson’s proposal to include verbal reports as explicit 
responses, thereby assimilating all the results of introspection to behaviorism. 
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In the paper, we have seen, Skinner shows that the rate at which rats eat food over the course 
of the two hours can be described by a power function. We can predict eating behavior without 
using the imprecise concepts of conventional psychology (e.g. ‘hunger’ or ‘motivation’) and 
without studying the rat’s physiology; it is enough to functionally describe the relation between 
stimulus and response.9 
When Boring repeated his argument against behaviorism in a 1932 article in Science 
(“It is worth noting that behaviorism owes its ism to consciousness. And what would it be 
without its ism? Well, it would be physiology”, p. 33), Skinner responded furiously. In a letter 
to his friend (and former fellow graduate student) Fred Keller, Skinner writes: 
 
Have you seen Boring’s article in Science? It’s scandalous. Probably the most 
astonishing misunderstanding of behaviorism yet attained, even by Boring. “Without 
consciousness, behaviorism has nothing left but the nervous system.” That sort of thing. 
Well, here’s to him, the stupid son-of-a-bitch.10 (ca. 1932, HUA accession 14328, Box 
1, Folder 4) 
 
9 Recall also Skinner’s description of his first aim in the above-discussed thirty-year ‘plan of 
the campaign’: “Experimental description of behavior […] No surrender to the physiology of 
the central nervous system” (November 17, 1932, HUGFP 60.50, Box 3, Folder 6, my 
emphasis).   
10 See also Skinner (1979, 93-94). Skinner’s antipathy toward Boring is a constant in the early 
1930s. See, for example, Skinner (1979, 94): “Boring developed the theme […] in a book […] 
which I used for years as an instrument of self-management. Whenever I found myself losing 
interest in the work at hand or even simply feeling tired, a few pages of Boring’s book had the 
effect of a dozen cups of coffee. What infuriated me was his refusal to recognize the possibility 
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The direct source of Skinner’s opposition to Boring, however, was not the latter’s argument 
against behaviorism. The seeds of Skinner’s aversion had already been sown in October 1930, 
when Boring heavily criticized the first version of his dissertation. In a 5-page letter, Boring 
dismissed the first part of Skinner’s thesis (on the notion of the reflex) in extraordinarily strong 
words. According to Boring, the central structure of Skinner’s thesis was utterly 
confused⎯there is no use in giving the notion of reflex a new meaning: 
 
You are making an argument for keeping the word reflex and giving it a new, broader 
and relatively strange meaning. […]  Now this is a pretty bold proposal and I question 
its value. You have given a very broad, strange, almost bizarre meaning to the word 
reflex. You have taken it away from the constrained anatomical reflex-arc meaning, and 
you have equated it to the concept of the psychological fact-as-relational-correlation 
which already has terms for itself. What is the use? 
[…] 
I do not mean to be harsh, but your very versatility and you[r] polemical c[le]verness 
make it necessary for older people to tell you bluntly where they think the trouble lies. 
Otherwise you might go on through life doing half-baked work which wins applause 
from the uncritical and the unsophisticated […] and thus never realizing that your work 
was superficial.11 (Boring to Skinner, Oct. 13, 1930, HUGFP 60.7, Box 1, Folder 2).  
 
 
of a science of behavior”. Skinner here refers to Boring’s The Physical Dimensions of 
Consciousness (1933), which will be discussed in section 5.  
11 Some of these passages are also quoted in Skinner (1979, 72-73) and Coleman (1985). 
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Clearly, Boring failed to see the relevance of Skinner’s attempt to provide an operational 
definition of ‘reflex'. Although some of Boring’s arguments seem justified, he appears to have 
misunderstood the purpose of Skinner’s project. To some extent, Boring’s misinterpretation of 
Skinner’s aims is understandable, however. Even in the published version of his paper on the 
notion of reflex, Skinner does not really discuss his methodology except for the very brief 
reference to Mach, Poincaré, and Bridgman quoted in section 3 and it is unclear whether this 
passage was already included in the version Boring read.12  
Skinner seems to have been aware that Boring simply failed to understand the nature 
of his project. In the margins of Boring’s second letter with comments on his thesis (December 
9, 1930), Skinner writes: “I’m not trying to do all you think” and “I want to define a science of 
the descrptn. of behavior […] and to define the concept of the reflex so that it is workable” 
(Skinner’s marginalia, HUGFP 60.7, Box 1, Folder 2, my transcription).13 Yet, instead of 
explaining this methodological background and writing ‘the introductory paragraph’ that 
Boring asked for, Skinner chose to resubmit his thesis essentially unchanged, informing Boring 
that the first draft had “been read by four other responsible people” and that “they have all 
expressed, in almost the same words, the opinion that it is a good job which needed to be done 
and has been done well”. Referring to the last part of Boring’s above-quoted comments, 
 
12 Boring was not the only psychologist who did not understand Skinner’s aims. Paul Huston, 
a former fellow graduate student, reported that people at Northampton were discussing the 
paper but “were a little puzzled” because it did not mention any experiment (November 5, 
1931, HUGFP 60.10, box 1). Similarly, Don Purdy noted that he was “not so clear as to just 
what” the paper had “to say regarding the causal theory of behavior” (November 5, 1931, 
HUGFP, 60.10, box 1). See Verhaegh (2019). 
13 I thank Julie Vargas for helping me transcribe Skinner’s marginalia on Boring’s comments.  
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Skinner adds: 
 
What am I am to think? Am I to assume that these four are uncritical and 
unsophisticated, and that if my work has won applause, it has nevertheless been 
superficial? Must I admit that I am ‘too clever always to be thorough?’ (Skinner to 
Boring, December 14, 1930, HUG 4229.5, Box 53, Item 1180) 
 
Instead of resolving the misunderstanding by clarifying the nature of his project, in other words, 
Skinner chose to dig in his heels. He informed Boring that the final decision “will be up to the 
committee” and ended his letter with a couplet from Thomas Hood’s ‘Bridge of Sighs’: 
“Owning her weakness, her evil behavior,/and leaving with meekness her sins to her Saviour” 
(ibid.). 
 
 
5. Boring’s proto-operationism  
 
Boring knew that his feedback on Skinner’s dissertation had been extraordinarily critical. A 
letter to Herbert Langfeld, however, shows that there were two sides to Boring’s assessment: 
although he genuinely believed that his student’s work was “epistemologically naïve”, he also 
saw that Skinner’s experimental work was unusually innovative. Ten months after Skinner 
obtained his Ph.D., Boring summarized the events as follows: 
 
I was not on the thesis committee, since I had criticized Skinner's views so vigorously 
in advance that I thought that he would feel that the committee had been stacked against 
him if I were to be on it. […] The point i[s] […] that Skinner, who thinks of himself as 
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a genius, was dealing with a fundamental issue of methodology where he was quite 
inexpert […] On the other hand, believe it or not, Skinner is an excellent experimentalist 
and has done some of the cleverest apparatus work with animals (self-recording 
devices) that we have had done here. (Boring to Langfeld, November 4, 1931, HUG 
4229.5, Box 33,  Item 735) 
 
Boring’s acknowledgment of Skinner’s experimental talents in the above letter shows that the 
theoretical misunderstanding between the two is unfortunate. For there is quite some evidence 
that Boring was actually sympathetic to operationist thinking⎯i.e. there is quite some evidence 
that Boring would have been more sympathetic to his student’s epistemological project if the 
latter had explained the nature of his project in more detail.14  
First of all, Boring’s criticism is primarily methodological. He complains that there is 
no reason to redefine the notion of reflex considering that the ‘concept of the psychological 
fact-as-relational-correlation […] already has terms for itself’. Boring’s arguments do not entail 
that he would have rejected Skinner’s definition if he had understood the latter’s purposes. On 
the contrary, Boring makes clear that he is “very sympathetic” to Skinner’s definition:  
 
The reflex is a fact, and therefore a relation, statable in terms of an experimentally 
observed correlation. You would have to know, even if only from dropping into 
Psychol.31 this fall, that this line of thought is one with which I am personally very 
sympathetic. (Boring to Skinner, October 13, 1930, HUGFP 60.7, Box 1, Folder 2). 
 
14 Coleman (1985) rightly suggests that Skinner’s thesis also appears to have offended Boring 
as a historian. Indeed, certain passages from Boring’s letter suggest that he was also upset about 
Skinner’s selective and uncritical history of the notion of reflex. 
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This remark does not stand on its own. Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, Boring often 
defended proto-operationist views that reveal a strong preference for strictly empirical 
definitions.15 In debates about the question whether intelligence tests measure what they ought 
to measure, for instance, Boring was well known for the view that “intelligence as a measurable 
capacity must at the start be defined as the capacity to do well in an intelligence test” (1923, 
35). Instead of viewing ‘intelligence’ as some hidden, mysterious property that escapes precise 
definition and can only be measured by approximation, Boring equated intelligence with the 
operations we use to measure it. Years before Bridgman published The Logic of Modern 
Physics, in other words, Boring was already arguing that intelligence is “what the tests test” 
(ibid.).16 
Second, when Boring, in The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness (1933), started to 
defend a mind/brain identity theory⎯arguing that mental processes are physical 
processes⎯he primarily used an operationist argument to justify his claim. Relying on 
experimental work that shows that there are strong correlations between mental and 
neurological processes, Boring argued:  
 
If we were to find a perfect correlation between sensation A and neural process a, a 
precise correlation which we had reason to believe never failed, we should then identify 
A and a. If introspection yielded A, it would yield knowledge of the nervous system; 
and, conversely, the physiologist would, in knowing about a, know about sensation. 
 
15 I call Boring’s position proto-operationism because it predates the publication of Bridgman’s 
The Logic of Modern Physics.  
16 See also Rogers (1989, 146), Green (1992, 297), and Feest (2005, 138).  
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(Boring 1933, 14) 
 
Instead of presupposing that mental processes and neural processes are intrinsically different 
and therefore unidentifiable kinds of events, Boring implicitly relied on the operationist 
assumption that the meaning a concept is fully determined by its observable effects and, hence, 
that “a perfect correlation is identity” (ibid., 16, my emphasis).17 
Boring’s theoretical orientation is a decidedly different one than Skinner’s. Boring 
never abandoned talk about ‘mental’ processes, he never adopted a behaviorist conceptual 
framework, and he never had any methodological concerns about physiological data. Still, the 
above arguments show that the two shared an (in Boring’s case, still implicit) penchant for 
operationist definitions; both Skinner and Boring strongly felt that the psychologist’s concepts 
ought to be defined in terms of publicly observable behavior. It is therefore doubly ironic that 
their theoretical dispute in the early 1930s turned precisely on Boring’s misunderstanding of 
the former’s operationist project. 
So how might we explain Boring’s and Skinner’s shared operationist leanings, 
considering their strong disagreements about behaviorism, introspection, and physiology? It is 
my contention that the answer can be found in a paper Boring wrote in the same month in 
which he ‘vigorously criticized’ Skinner’s thesis. In the paper⎯titled “The Psychologist’s 
Circle”⎯Boring argues that the most fundamental distinction in psychology is the opposition 
between psychologists who believe that all scientific facts are inferred from sense experience 
(he mentions Wundt and Köhler as examples) and psychologists who believe that “the 
 
17 Indeed, in looking back on his own operationist turn, Boring himself also claimed that “his 
basic faith in operationism” was already “[t]ucked away” in his “little book” The Physical 
Dimensions of Consciousness (1952, 44). 
 
24 
phenomenal processes of introspective psychology must be regarded as dependent upon the 
nervous system” (e.g. Avenarius and Külpe). The first perspective entails that psychology is 
propaedeutic to physics whereas the second perspective implies that physics offers the most 
fundamental perspective. (Boring 1931, 178-9).  
Skinner, we have seen, attempts to dissolve this circle by choosing something like the 
latter option. Although he certainly does not aim to study physiological processes, he strongly 
rejects the Wundtian (phenomenalist) horn of Boring’s dilemma (see section 3). Now, despite 
all their differences, Boring makes a similar point. Although he does not use a behaviorist 
vocabulary, Boring implicitly defends a variant of operationism in arguing that we can dissolve 
the psychologist’s circle if we recognize that both sides of the divide are essentially working 
with constructed concepts⎯i.e. if we acknowledge that physical and psychological facts are 
‘mediate’. According to Boring, the ‘experience-first’ psychologists are simply “wrong in 
implying […] that the subject-matter of psychology is in any way more ‘phenomenal,’ 
‘immediate,’ or ‘direct’ than the subject matter of physics” (1931, 180-1). The physicist and 
the psychologist, in other words, are in the same boat; since there “is no way of getting at 
‘direct experience’”, both the concepts of physics and the concepts of psychology are 
“systematic constructs” (1933, 6).   
Of course, as soon as one recognizes that the concepts of psychology are theoretical 
constructs, the question arises how they are constructed⎯i.e. how they are related to our 
experimental data. As soon as he acknowledged that the concepts of psychology are precisely 
that⎯concepts⎯Boring faced the very question Bridgman had asked about physical concepts: 
how can we ensure that psychologists are talking about the same things when they are 
discussing their theories about ‘experience’, ‘consciousness’, and ‘sensation’?   
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6. McGregor’s theory of measurement 
 
Considering his novel views about psychological concepts in the early 1930s, it is perhaps no 
surprise that Boring became heavily interested in Bridgman’s operational approach. Indeed, he 
extensively discussed Bridgman’s The Logic of Modern Physics in his 1934 graduate seminar 
on “The Data of Psychology”, a class that was attended by Douglas McGregor and Stanley 
Smith Stevens. On the very last day of the seminar, Boring wrote Bridgman a note, informing 
him that he and his students had “been very much interested in the epistemology of 
operationalism” that winter (May 28, 1934, HUG 4229.5, Box 5, Item 106).18  
When McGregor attended Boring’s seminar, he was a second-year graduate student. 
He had obtained a B.A. from Wayne University and had been admitted to Harvard graduate 
school in 1932. Once in Cambridge, he had quickly shown an interest in the psychophysical 
projects that Boring was working on with Stevens (who had been admitted to Harvard a year 
before McGregor). After some brief excursions into experiments with mice and work on motor 
learning at Worcester State Hospital, McGregor wrote Boring about his wish to work on one 
of Boring’s topics (“I can think of nothing I would like better than to be doing a problem under 
 
18 It is not completely clear how Boring learned about Bridgman’s operational approach. After 
all, Boring’s dismissal of Skinner’s approach strongly suggests that he did not yet know about 
Bridgman’s book in 1930 (or, at the very least, that he failed to see the connection between 
Bridgman’s approach and Skinner’s project). Perhaps Bridgman himself indirectly played an 
important role in convincing Boring to discuss the operational approach in the seminar. For 
both Bridgman and Boring were active members of the Harvard Shop Club, a small society in 
which Harvard professors presented and discussed their work. See, for example, Boring’s 
invitation to Bridgman from October 8, 1931 (HUG 4229.5, Box 5, Item 105). 
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you”, July 17, 1933, HUG 4229.5, Box 38, item 812). This work on Boring’s psychophysical 
projects eventually resulted in a dissertation about color sensitivity (defended in June 1935)⎯a 
thesis which, in Boring’s opinion, “definitively alter[ed] the prevailing conceptions about the 
nature of color blindness” (Boring to Tracy McGregor, April 12, 1935, HUG 4229.5, Box 38, 
item 813). A year before he defended his dissertation, McGregor participated in Boring’s 
seminar and wrote “Scientific Measurement and Psychology”, the purpose of which is to show 
that recent ‘findings’ about measurement in the natural sciences also have consequences for 
measurement in psychology:   
 
recent concern about the validity of scientific measurement has aroused but slight 
interest among psychologists, possibly because they think that a great gulf exists 
between physical and psychological methodologies. It is the purpose of this paper to 
demonstrate that such a gulf does not exist […] If we, as psychologists, are to have 
measurement of any value whatever we must accept the logical restrictions imposed 
within other sciences. (1935, 246) 
 
Not surprisingly, the ‘modern theories of measurement’ McGregor refers to are ‘operationist’ 
theories, which claim that “an entity is adequately defined only in terms of the specific 
operations involved in its observation” (ibid., 247). 
  “Scientific Measurement and Psychology” is a significant contribution to the 
development of operationism because it modifies the discussion about operational definition 
in two ways. First, it provides a novel answer to the question of what an operation ultimately 
is. Whereas Bridgman and Skinner, at least in their publications before 1935, do not attempt to 
define the term ‘operation’, McGregor offers something like an operationalization of the term 
‘operation’ as well: he suggests that operations are ultimately discriminations. No matter how 
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complex our concepts are, if they are operationally defined, they can ultimately be reduced to 
a series of discriminations: 
 
An object is said to be 10 centimeters long when, under specified conditions, the 
observer can detect no difference in length between the object and a portion of the scale 
comprising 10 centimeters […] With weight, a fundamental magnitude, the 
discrimination involves the pointer and the scale of a balance […] Even with ‘robot’ 
measurement, such as that provided by the photo-electric cell, calibration is necessary, 
and calibration involves discrimination. (1935, 248, 258) 
 
As a result, McGregor’s claim that a concept is ‘adequately defined only in terms of the specific 
operations involved in its observation’ can be restated as the claim that a concept is adequately 
defined only if we are physically able to discriminate between situations in which the concept 
does and does not apply.  
A second way in which McGregor changes the discussion about operational definition 
is that he essentially turns operationism into a methodology for psychophysics. Although he 
opens his paper with the claim that he will be discussing the ‘importance of modern theories 
of measurement for psychology’, McGregor’s paper is exclusively concerned with 
psychophysical research: his examples of psychological variables include only 
characteristically psychophysical variables like “[c]hromatic saturation, loudness, weight, 
pressure, sweetness, pain,” and McGregor and Stevens’ own objects of study “visual brilliance 
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[…] tonal volume and tonal density” (ibid., 259-60).19 Whereas Skinner had primarily used 
operationism to justify his behaviorist approach to psychology, in other words, McGregor 
constructed an operationist theory of measurement to justify the approach Boring, Stevens, and 
he himself were using. 
McGregor’s two ‘innovations’⎯a discrimination-based interpretation of operational 
definition and the application of operationism to psychophysical research⎯are intimately 
connected. For it is no coincidence that McGregor also views discriminational analysis as the 
most important instrument in the psychophysicist’s toolbox: to study color sensitivity or tonal 
density is to study the discriminatory capacities of test subjects. In McGregor’s paper, 
psychophysical measurement is reinterpreted as the measurement of the discriminatory 
capacities of a physical system: just as we can test the discriminatory capabilities of a digital 
kitchen scale by gradually increasing the amount of flour on its surface, we can examine a 
person’s color sensitivity by examining when a subject is and is not able to discriminate 
between two colors.20  
 
19 See also Michell’s assessment in his Measurement in Psychology: “McGregor […] confined 
himself to psychophysics, thus not attending to intellectual abilities, personality traits, or other 
psychological attributes” (2004, 141).  
20  Note that in defining psychophysical research in this way, McGregor implicitly 
circumvented Johnson’s worry that psychophysics relies on a concept (‘intensity of sensation’) 
that cannot be operationally defined (see section 3). See, for example, McGregor’s discussion 
of Fechner’s law, which concludes that 𝛾 is a magnitude “measured under special operational 
conditions which are specifically designed to shed light upon the functioning of the organism” 
and that 𝛾  is “as physical or as psychological” as 𝛽  (1934, 263). See also “The Direct 
Estimation of Sensory Magnitudes: Loudness” (Stevens 1956) for Stevens’ implicit response 
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In (1) classifying operational definition as the guiding principle of measurement in the 
natural sciences, in (2) suggesting that operations are ultimately discriminations, and in (3) 
reinterpreting psychophysics as the study of discriminatory capacities, therefore, McGregor 
effectively turned psychophysics into a natural science. Indeed, McGregor’s concluding 
paragraph leaves no doubt that this was part of his agenda: 
 
Psychological measurement, understood in operational terms […] is physical 
measurement. It always has been. And the psychologist, now aware that he is using no 
mysteriously unique scientific instrument (the observer), can, secure in his new self-
knowledge, proceed with his measurements, unimpeded by the hampering difficulties 
of the Cartesian dichotomy between mind and body. (1935, 265-6) 
 
When observers are reinterpreted as physical systems with certain discriminatory capabilities, 
in other words, the operationist circumvents questions about the nature of observing subjects 
and turns psychology (or better: psychophysics) into a natural science. 
 
 
7. Boring’s influence 
 
Boring wholeheartedly agreed with McGregor’s conclusions. In a letter to Herbert Langfeld, 
he describes McGregor as one of his “up-and-comings” and praises the paper in extraordinarily 
strong terms:  
 
to Johnson’s argument. Unfortunately, McGregor and Stevens have never explicitly responded 
to Johnson’s paper.  
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I cannot escape from the belief that [McGregor’s] paper says the most important thing 
about mental measurement that has been said in the last twenty or thirty years […]. 
Secondarily, in doing that and in appealing to operationism, he makes a secondary point 
in favor of monism and against a dualism, a point that seems to me so inevitable and 
convincing as to have me hopping up and down. (October 29, 1934, HUG 4229.5, Box 
34, Item 736) 
 
Considering his proto-operationist views in the 1920s and early 1930s (section 5), it is no 
coincidence that Boring agreed with McGregor’s conclusions. In addition, he had examined a 
very similar position in his 1921 paper “The Stimulus-Error”. In response to the so-called 
quantity-objection to psychophysics⎯the problem that it is impossible to find quantitative 
correlations between physical stimuli and sensations because sensations do not admit of 
quantitative description⎯Boring discussed a solution he dubbed the “psychology of capacity”, 
which is the view that psychophysics is not measuring sensation but “capacity-for-
discrimination” (Boring 1921, 459). Rather than viewing psychophysics as correlating mental 
and physical phenomena, the ‘psychology of capacity’ approach claims that psychophysics 
only describes physical stimuli and “errors of observation incurred in observing the stimuli” 
(ibid.).21  
The similarities between Boring (1921) and McGregor (1935) raise the question to what 
 
21 Michell (2004) even goes so far as to claim that McGregor paper was “aged wine in [a] new 
operationist bottle” as his reinterpretation of psychophysics had already “been canvassed by 
Boring (1921) more than a decade before” (p. 142). This is too strong, however, as Boring did 
not yet fully endorse the “psychology of capacity” approach in 1921. 
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extent Boring influenced his student. Luckily, there is some archival evidence that sheds light 
on the way in which McGregor’s paper was produced. In the above-discussed letter to 
Langfeld, for example, Boring admits that he played a substantial role in writing the paper and 
that he feels as if the paper is partly his: 
 
It is not a joint publication by McGregor and me, because he has really done all the 
hard work. On the other hand I have spent three strenuous seven-hour Sundays on it 
and innumerable other little conferences, so that many of the sentences I know by heart, 
and I feel as if the paper belonged in part to me. (October 29, 1934, HUG 4229.5, Box 
34, Item 736) 
 
In a letter to Stevens, moreover, Boring claims that McGregor’s first draft was not very good 
and suggests that he has read and criticized six drafts before it was ready for publication (ca. 
November 1934, HUGFP 2.10, Box 1, Folder 3). It is likely therefore that McGregor’s views 
were heavily influenced by Boring, especially because he was still a second-year graduate 
student when he wrote the paper. Boring refused to accept a co-authorship, however, because 
he was strongly opposed to the practice of co-authorships between students and supervisors.22 
Boring only agreed to write a signed footnote on the opening page of McGregor’s paper⎯a 
footnote in which he states that “McGregor […] and I have worked in close collaboration” and 
that he is “in hearty accord with everything [McGregor] says” (1935, 245n1). 
 
 
 
 
22 See, for example, Stevens (1968, 600). 
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8. Stevens’ manifesto 
 
McGregor’s paper was not the only iron in Boring’s fire. For, in the fall semester of 1934, 
Stanley Smith Stevens was working on an operationist paper as well⎯a paper, moreover, that 
also (1) primarily addresses psychophysical research and (2) defends the position that 
“[d]iscrimination is the sine qua non of any and every operation” (Stevens 1935a, 324, original 
emphasis). Stevens, as has been well documented in the literature on the development of 
operationism, also argued that operations are ultimately discriminations and that it is the goal 
of psychology to “measure the discriminatory capacity of the organism” (ibid., 325). The 
similarity between McGregor’s and Stevens’ papers is especially striking in their discussions 
of the status of psychological research. Like McGregor, Stevens argues that “the relation of the 
psychologist to the object of his investigation is fundamentally not different from that of any 
other scientist to his subject-matter”: 
 
The body of psychological science as it now stands relates to verifiable responses 
obtained from organisms treated as objects of study by capable experimenters […] The 
same relationship must obtain in all scientific psychology. The utility of this type of 
'objective' approach lies in the fact that all operations involved are essentially public 
and repeatable. A human being enters the situation as a complex physical system whose 
characteristics can be investigated by a method essentially the same as the methods used 
for the investigation of all physical systems.23 (ibid., 328)  
 
 
23 See also the similarities between McGregor’s (1935, 262-3) and Stevens’ (1935a, 329) 
discussions of Weber’s laws.  
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Stevens wrote “The Operational Basis of Psychology” during his first year as a National 
Research Council Fellow at Harvard Medical School, where he was working with Hallowell 
Davis. Before his fellowship, however, Stevens had been Boring’s student and assistant for 
three years; and it was in this capacity that he first encountered psychophysical research. In 
April 1932, only two months after he had decided to pursue a degree in experimental 
psychology (Stevens 1974, 18), Boring had asked Stevens to read the first draft of The Physical 
Dimensions of Consciousness in order to obtain some general comments from a non-
specialized reader.  
One can imagine the impact this advisory role had on Stevens’ development, especially 
because it was his first encounter with serious psychophysical research.24 And indeed, when 
the book came out in January 1933, Stevens proudly reported his contribution in his notebook:  
 
Prof. Boring’s book on the physical nature of consciousness will be out tomorrow […] 
He refer[r]ed to it in conversation as our book. I acknowledged the compliment. 
Reading the manuscript was a particularly pleasant task—a privilege rather than a job; 
and especially so since Prof. Boring’s impatience with the dualism which he nominates 
for the ash heap is very similar to my own. (January 22, 1933, HUGFP 2.45, Box 1, 
Folder 1) 
 
In that same semester, Stevens decided to write his thesis in psychophysics and informed 
Boring that the subject of his dissertation would be “the measurement of intensity and volume 
in audition” (Stevens to Boring, October 14, 1932, HUG 4229.5, Box 54, Item 1215), a relation 
 
24 During his first semester at Harvard, Stevens was still registered as a student at the School 
of Education. 
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Boring had classified as ‘somewhat of a puzzle’ in The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness 
(1933, 82).  Not even two years later, Stevens would be writing the seminal paper in which he 
argued that it “is the sole business of psychology to test and measure the discriminatory 
capacities of the organism” (1935a, 325). 
Gary Hardcastle has argued that Boring played only a limited role in the development 
of  Stevens’ operationism.25   Considering (1) the background of the relation between Boring 
and Stevens, (2) Boring’s operationist development in the 1920s and early 1930s, (3) Boring’s 
significant influence on McGregor’s paper, and (4) the similarities between McGregor’s and 
Stevens’ papers, however, I think that his account needs to be reevaluated. Although it is 
difficult to determine the exact dynamic of the relation between Boring, Stevens, and 
McGregor during the seminar meetings, it is likely that Boring played a substantial role in 
shaping both Stevens’ and McGregor’s views as he was both their supervisor and had been 
gradually evolving toward a very similar position for more than fifteen years.  
 There is some additional evidence for my thesis in Stevens’ own recollection of the 
early 1930s. For Stevens himself has explicitly argued that Boring had already come close to 
formulating an operationist perspective in The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness:   
 
The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness […] showed how far Boring in 1932 had 
departed from the Titchenerian tradition, it was […] an effort (as part of Boring’s 
 
25 See Hardcastle (1995, 420-22): “It would be natural to identify E. G. Boring […] as a motive 
force behind Stevens’ operationism. Stevens suggested as much in a tribute he wrote of Boring 
in 1968 […] Yet Stevens’ attribution is in the end too generous […] Boring’s comments […] 
record not the molding of a disciple, but a healthy ‘give and take’ between a vigorous senior 
professor and his energetic and (likely over-)confident student.” 
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enduring effort) to achieve clarity for the meaning of the basic terms of psychology, 
terms like consciousness, sensation, and the rest […] Boring knew whereof he wanted 
to escape, but at that stage he was too entangled in his past to effect a clean restatement 
[…] it now seems clear that an operational restatement of psychology’s basic concepts 
was Boring’s real target. The [1935 paper on operationism] appeared under my name, 
but it can be proved from page upon page of editorial criticism that large segments of 
those papers were generated more by Boring than by me. (Stevens 1968, 596-7) 
 
Indeed, Boring’s twelve pages of typed, single-spaced comments on the four drafts of “The 
Operational Basis of Psychology” strongly suggest that Boring still had a major influence on 
Stevens’ development after he started working at Davis’ lab in September 1934. For although 
Hardcastle is correct in concluding that about two-thirds of Boring’s comments are “concerned 
solely with style” (1995, 420), the comments also show that Boring and Stevens were still 
regularly discussing substantial issues in person.26  
More importantly, Boring’s extensive comments on Stevens’ drafts reveal that Boring 
was the driving force behind the manifesto-like language of Stevens’ papers. For Boring’s 
comments show that the strongest sentences of the paper (e.g. “the revolution to end the 
possibility of revolutions” and “it is the sole business of psychology to test and measure the 
discriminatory capacities of the organism”) are Boring’s (HUGFP 2.10, Box 1, Folder 3). In 
 
26 See, for example, Boring in his set of comments on the first draft (“I have made the argument 
to you orally this afternoon”), Stevens’ reply to Boring’s comments on the second draft (“Our 
discussion of this afternoon convinced me that…”), and Boring’s comments on Stevens’ third 
draft (“Our discussion of the meaning of similarity is a case in point”) (HUGFP 2.10, Box 1, 
Folder 3). 
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general, it appears that Boring liked the idea of establishing a psychological school of his own. 
For it was Boring who cheerfully reported to Stevens that “operationism is getting identified 
in psychology with you and me and Harvard” when people started to ask him questions about 
operationism (October 12, 1935, HUGFP 2.10, Box 1, Folder 3), it was Boring who organized 
the influential 1945 symposium on operationism (Langfeld to Stevens, August 3, 1944, 
HUGFP 2.12, Box 2, Item 16), and it was Boring it who would identify operationism as one of 
the eight main schools in psychology in an encyclopedia article in 1946. In this entry, Boring 
even goes as far as classifying behaviorism as a variety of operationism (“operationism […] 
includes behaviorism”) and as concluding that, as a result, “the modern dichotomy in 
systematic psychology lies between operationism […] and phenomenology” (ca. June 1946, 
HUG 4229.5, Box 6, Item 113).27 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have reconstructed some of the debates about operationism at Harvard’s 
Department of Philosophy and Psychology in the late 1920s and early 1930s in order to get a 
more complete understanding of the context in which Stevens published his call for a 
“revolution that will put an end to the possibility of revolutions” in psychology. I have 
discussed the operationist approaches developed by (1) B. F. Skinner, who adopted an 
explicitly operationist method in both his dissertation and his unpublished notebook Sketch for 
 
27  At the symposium on operationism, Skinner hit back by reducing operationism to 
behaviorism, calling it ‘methodological behaviorism’. See Skinner (1945), Day (1983) and 
Moore (2013ab). 
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an Epistemology; by (2) Douglas McGregor, who applied Bridgman’s perspective in his paper 
“Scientific Measurement and Psychology”; and by (3) E. G. Boring, who played an important 
role in supervising McGregor and Stevens and defended proto-operationist views throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s.  
I have argued that these Harvard psychologists mostly used Bridgman’s call for 
conceptual hygiene to justify their existing approaches to psychology and to attack theories 
and concepts from opposing schools. Skinner, we have seen, used Bridgman’s methodological 
strictures both to argue against ‘mentalistic’ and ‘phenomenalistic’ concepts and to create space 
for his ‘science of behavior’, a discipline that would circumvent Boring’s dilemma that 
behaviorism either reduces to physiology or incorporates the problems of traditional 
psychology. Boring failed to see the merits of Skinner’s operationist approach⎯repeatedly 
classifying him as ‘epistemologically naïve’⎯but he quickly adopted a variant of operationism 
once he realized that Bridgman’s perspective fitted with his views about psychological 
concepts as outlined in The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness. Two of his 
students⎯McGregor and Stevens⎯in turn, used operationism to validate Boring’s 
psychophysical research. This is especially clear in McGregor’s paper on scientific 
measurement in psychology, which used Bridgman’s perspective to argue that psychophysics 
should be viewed as a natural science.  
In the end, it was Stevens’ two-part paper that put psychological operationism on the 
academic map. In these papers, Stevens presented operationism as a “straightforward 
procedure for the definition and validation of concepts” (Stevens 1935a, 323) but in practice, 
the procedure turned out to be much less clear-cut than he presumed. Indeed, when Skinner 
read Stevens’ papers⎯especially the passage in which the latter claimed that “[i]t is the sole 
business of psychology to test and measure the discriminatory capacities of the organism” 
(ibid., 325)⎯he responded by dismissing the latter’s psychophysicist’s variant of 
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operationism:  
 
That is your heritage from Wundt and Fechner […] What is happening in a 
discrimination, and what properties organisms actually do use in setting up classes 
(concepts, objects) are far more important questions. […] As I have said so many times 
that I blush to say it again⎯if you approach the behavior of an organism as an object 
of scientific study and set to work, it would be a long time before you would reach the 
field of discriminatory capacity. (June 16, 1935, HUGFP 2.10, Box 1, Folder 26) 
 
Instead of a ‘straightforward procedure for the definition of concepts’, in other words, 
operationism predominantly functioned as a new weapon to continue existing theoretical 
rivalries by different means. Whereas Boring and his students reduced psychology to study of 
discriminatory capacities, defining operations as discriminations, Skinner believed that a 
completely different set of concepts was needed. For him, a true operationist analysis would 
show that the concepts of traditional psychology are confused, just as his own analysis had 
shown about the conventional notion of ‘reflex’.  
Considering these developments, it is not surprising that Bridgman soon became fed up 
with the way in which the Harvard psychologists used his appeal for conceptual hygiene. 
Indeed, when Stevens had the opportunity to work with Bridgman for a semester after he had 
been awarded a General Education Board Training Fellowship (May 23, 1935, HUGFP 2.10, 
Box 1, Folder 8), it soon became clear that an unbridgeable gap had emerged. In a letter to his 
close colleague Arthur Bentley, Bridgman complained that Stevens’ version of operationism 
was “just plain twisted” and by May 1936, he said that he had “washed [his] hands of him” 
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(Bridgman to Bentley, May 4, 1936, HUGFP 4234.10, Box 1, Folder 10).28 In the eight years 
between The Logic of Modern Physics and Stevens’ “The Operational Basis of Psychology”, 
in other words, the psychologists’ ideas about operational definition had been so adapted to 
their own theoretical needs that, for Bridgman, they had evolved beyond recognition.  
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